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I have been asked to give a practitioner’s perspec-
tive. This is not an accounting practitioner’s 
perspective; if anything, it is an investment practi-
tioner’s perspective. It cuts across all of the issues
that you have been discussing. I will try to do that
quite quickly, with just two or three points.
As background to my observations, I lead 3i’s
global healthcare practice so I see a lot of the in-
formation that Glaxo sees but at a much, much ear-
lier stage, particularly in our venture capital
business where I see the creation of intangibles.
I also focus particularly on public companies. I
invest in, and sit on the boards of, established com-
panies. We have a business called Quoted Private
Equity, which is a strange label, but through it I see
the issues that we all wrestle with in the public
company disclosure domain. 
At 3i I have nurtured for a decade now our in-
terest in central and eastern Europe, where we
have quite an active venture, with offices in
Warsaw, Prague, Budapest and, most recently in
Bucharest. It is one of the few places where with
intangibles you could go negative and put a brack-
et around them. I do not know how often you dis-
cuss political risk or indeed the organised crime
risk, but I see it very much in the flesh. 
That outlines my role at 3i. I shall weave some
of those perspectives into what I say. I should also
say that I am not an accountant. I am a lawyer. I
studied law in Scotland. I failed what they called
accounting and tax law, if you can imagine such a
thing, and at the same time, in the same year, won
a prize in jurisprudence, which is the theory of law,
because I’d written a little mini-thesis which laud-
ed accounting and tax law as examples of good
law! So I have opinions on everything, but do not
know very much about the detail. I thought I’d just
share that with you!
Looking forward, I am going straight from here
to New York to a meeting which will negotiate this
evening (New York time) from 8 p.m. through to
11 p.m., which is about 4 a.m. London time, on a
particular transaction which everyone who is in-
volved wants to get closed before Christmas. I shall
return to that later as it is relevant to intangibles.
In my investment practitioner’s perspective I
should like to share with you three specific obser-
vations.
First, I have been in the investment business for
some time. My very first day at 3i was Black
Monday in 1987, which was an interesting place to
start. Over the 20 years since then I have seen
some incredible changes in perspectives from an
investor’s point of view. And it really has changed.
When I was first investing through 3i, as an eq-
uity investor taking risk capital investments in
companies, we used to prepare an asset cover
schedule for every investment that we made.
Banks were worried about realisable values in the
event of insolvency and liquidation. As an equity
investor we used to prepare asset cover schedules
as well, to see, after the debt was recovered, what
would be available by way of distributions to the
shareholders. We had to offset all the prior claims
of all the preferred creditors. However, we spent a
great deal of time in a great deal of detail going
through the balance sheets of the companies in
which we were about to take risk investments.
Fast forward to today, 2007, and particularly in
healthcare – but also in media and some other sec-
tors – the investment industry will apply multiples
of EBITDA of 15, 16 or 17, for companies. There
is certainly no asset cover on the equity. On the
debt, there is only partial cover on any basis; either
the going concern or the wind-up basis. On top of
that, there is a whole range of amplifying risks like
the roll-up of interest or PIK (payment-in-kind)
notes where interest costs on debt are not paid but
are accumulated as a charge. When I think back on
it, the whole mindset of investment has shifted
dramatically so that items which were intangible
and which were not realisable assets and were 
not physical corporeal assets were unacceptable 
20 years ago but are absolutely accepted now. That
carries with it a whole range of knock-on effects in
the way that people think and account for their in-
vestments and the valuation of assets.
I should also just highlight that in getting from
1987 to 2007 we obviously went via the 1990s,
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and particularly the late 1990s. I see my colleagues
nodding, with their painful memory for our indus-
try. This is not specific to 3i; things did go ab-
solutely to excess in that dot.com bubble. We had,
for all the talk of portfolio effect, to equalise some
of the uncertainties around intangibles and some of
the judgment calls on the less quantifiably measur-
able things. We had at 3i something like 3,000 in-
vestments, marking everything by best judgment,
putting a value on each one of those, item by item,
and being a little bit concerned at the over-value
that external events were forcing. Yet 3i itself,
across 3,000 assets, as a FTSE 100 company was
trading at a 60% premium to its best judgment net
asset value, as other people tried to look through
that and make judgments about how conservative
3i was being.
I would say that over time we have gone from
the ’70s and ’80s where investment perceptions
around assets with intangibles were irrelevant and
it was all about hard assets, and then we’ve gone
through some craziness. And we have come back
recently, over the last five or six years, to a more
conservative view as an investment industry,
whether it involves private equity or public equity
views on intangibles. Let’s just keep a lid on the
exuberance!
The second point I’d make as an investment per-
spective is to share with you how we actually do in
practice value things, particularly the venture cap-
ital industry globally. 
A couple of hundred billion dollars a year move
around in that marketplace. This amount is applied
by people striking a deal to invest in one idea or
another: ’We will give you $30m to do this and we
will have 30% of the equity in your company.’
The British Venture Capital Association
(BVCA), or the European equivalent (EVCA), or
the American NVCA, all say the same on intangi-
bles – so while technically the International
Accounting Standard IAS 38 or the UK Statement
of Standard Accounting Practice SSAP 13, or in-
deed International Financial Reporting Standards
generally, may all disagree about recognition and
capitalising or expensing – the investment industry
says, ‘if there is any conflict between the way we
think about valuing something and any of those
rules, whichever standard is applicable, then the
standard dominates, and our subjective view sub-
ordinates.’ Yet in reality I do not see that. I cannot
join this up. So for me in reality there is disconnect
between net asset value (NAV) and fair market
value because if, in my example, we put $30m into
an idea, a new drug or launch of a new media
brand, and we take 30% of the equity, with an im-
puted enterprise value of $100m for this thing,
then the whole venture capital industry for some
time will hold the $30m investment and account
for it as a $30m investment despite the fact that
that $30m is being spent and burned away and
losses are being incurred, and the NAV of the enti-
ty is rocketing down. And then, at some point, it
will look for an event, or some kind of rationale,
upon which to pin a new value. But there is quite
a disconnect for quite some time between the entry
imputed valuation and what is happening in the
real world with that particular company. And
again, I am not technical enough to rationalise and
re-join that disconnect. But I would remark, from
what I heard today, that it is there and it is for me
a quirky little thing.
Again, the message I would say is that the in-
vestment industry, as a whole, is becoming slight-
ly more conservative over the last five or six years.
Yet whatever way you look at it, it’s not a NAV-
driven mindset in private equity, or indeed in the
investment industry as a whole – it has moved
away from the most conservative perspective. It
has at times been a bit ludicrous, yet I would say
actually the zeitgeist, the shift in the last five years
across most of the investment mindsets, is to
something slightly more conservative. If I try to
explain that – and this will be my third and last
perspective to share – the most important practi-
tioner insight I would leave is that, from an invest-
ment mindset, all this debate around intangibles
and valuation, actually boils down to entry, which
means the time that you invest, and exit, which
means what you think you are going to get for your
asset when you realise.
Again, this is not a technical thing, but philo-
sophically all the going concern mindset around
expensing assets, about amortising them, or valua-
tion uplifts or adjustments, really does not apply in
investment industries. Absolutely everything feeds
off entry and exit. And again, looking back to
where I’m going in the next 12 hours, we are going
to try to close an investment. It’s an asset in which
we, 3i, are investing. There are two other new in-
stitutions wanting to invest in that asset. The value
range that we have been debating is quite huge, be-
tween $370m and $460m. In reality it is much nar-
rower; it’s around $400–420m. Tonight, by 11 p.m.
New York time, 4 a.m. here, we will have resolved
that and will have shaken hands on it. 
However, whatever we shake hands on as the
figure for that company will have many knock-on
impacts. It would be impossible for me to articu-
late that to you in the technical language of intan-
gibles but it will have a very direct impact in the
accounting for at least ten entities: for 3i and the
other two current investors; for the two incoming
investors; for the company itself in which every-
one is investing; and indeed all the way back
through the limited partners and the investors in
those funds; and goodness knows how many pen-
sioners and life insurance policy-holders behind. 
This does not give you any answers, but as a 









































perspective the investment industry is preoccupied
by entry to exit, and then will justify that as a 
judgment call over three years, five years or ten
years, whatever the holding period is. The actual
essence of the intangible and how you build up 
the argumentation, frankly is not prevalent in the
judgment call around how these values are set. I
will leave it at that.
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